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Preface 
 
This report has been established within the Flexiheat project. Flexiheat has focused on increasing 
flexibility in district heating systems. The intelligent district heating network is a dynamic network: an 
open network where different waste heat and renewable energy sources are connected, that has 
multiple producers and groups of consumers and facilitates the connection between different energy 
infrastructures (gas, heat and electricity). Eventually this will lead to an optimal deployment of the 
available heat sources and an increased cost-efficiency of district heating. Flexiheat aims to develop 
new concepts for these intelligent, flexible district heating networks. One of the strategies is to allow 
third party access to the network. A smart control system is developed to manage the heat flows 
across the network. This system makes use of dynamic pricing. In this exploration the concept of 
third party access in relation to the Flexiheat project will be discussed. The development of new 
business and price models based on the Flexiheat approach has led to an analysis of possible 
alternative price models for consumers. 
The research topics of Flexiheat are applied to several practical cases to show the possible impact of 
the new developments on those situations. One of the cases was the city of Groningen, where a 
geothermal heating grid is under construction. With this exploration, we would like to advice 
Warmtestad, the organization developing the network in Groningen, on possible measures to 
increase the attractiveness of the new district heating networks to consumers.   
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Introduction  
 
District heating networks (DHN) are recently gaining attention as a strategy to achieve CO2 emission 
reductions in the built environment, especially among (local) governments and other public parties. 
District heating networks are often developed from a public interest point of view rather than from a 
commercial point of view, in which a firm aims to gain revenue by creating value to customers. A 
major issue in the development of district heating networks is the lack of attention for creating a 
product that customers value and are willing to pay for. This will be key in designing robust business 
models that that better comply with customer needs and expectations.  
This document is an exploration to customers’ attitude towards district heating and possible 
solutions for increasing the attractiveness of district heating technology. The insights of this 
exploration can be used to develop new business and price models for the district heating sector.  
Ultimately, this will lead to higher customer satisfaction and a strengthened district heating sector. 
The focus is on the products and price options that are offered to consumers in order to make district 
heating networks an attractive alternative for gas heating. 
An short analysis of market failures shows how consumer issues can be explained from an economic 
point of view (chapter 1). International experiences of existing and developing district heating 
networks are used in a literature review in order to gain understanding of the needs and 
expectations of customers (chapter 2). Using these insights, two strategies will be presented that 
deal with some the most important barriers for district heating, which are trust towards a 
monopolistic district heating company, a lack of consumer choice and high district heating prices. 
One strategy is to allow third party access to the network (chapter 3), the other strategy is the 
development of alternative price models (chapter 4). Finally, some recommendations will be given 
for further researching the possibilities of increasing attractiveness of district heating networks to 
consumers. 
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1. Identification of market failures 
 
In this first section, the current difficulties in the heat market will be mapped in a quick scan of 
market failures, with the goal of identifying possible strategies for the issues that need to be solved 
to design attractive business models for district heating networks. For each problem, the issues will 
be described and possible causes and solutions will be indicated.  
 
1.1 Problem 1: Consumer choice  
Issues:  In district heating networks, there is one vertically integrated district heating company. This 
means that consumers generally have no opportunity to switch to another retailer once connected to 
a heat network. There are also limited possibilities to redress when the service or billing falls short 
(Which?, 2015). Consumers cannot profit from switching to the cheapest energy retailer yearly and 
profit from this price advantage, as is the case in gas and electricity networks. In a time where 
consumers increasingly want to be in charge of their own energy supply and developments such as 
citizen participation and ‘prosumers’ are gaining popularity, obliged connection is hard to sell. How 
can this issue be addressed in a way that the development of heat networks will be strengthened? 
Possible causes: market power (natural monopoly), network externalities 
Possible solutions: more flexible contracts, product and price differentiation, increasing choice 
between heating alternatives (instead of obliged connection), more choice in suppliers through TPA. 
1.2 Problem 2: Monopoly pricing  
Issues: Heat networks are natural monopolies and without regulation, the situation could lead to 
monopoly pricing. In the Netherlands we have a regulated market, based on price cap regulation. 
Regulated markets based on cost-plus pricing or marginal cost-pricing are also possible. Various 
countries know a deregulated market. Both fully regulated markets and fully deregulated markets 
have their advantages and disadvantages in terms of balancing the interests of producers and 
consumers. However, there is a consensus that an efficient DH market must operate on a free 
competition basis, under regulatory control” (Li et al, 2015).  
 
Consumers complain about too high prices and being worse off than with gas fired boilers. 
Regulation is currently failing to sufficiently protect consumers against monopoly pricing. The Dutch 
district heating act is considered to be not trustworthy and effective in protecting consumers. 
Consumers are ‘suspicious’. They are also not protected against sudden price increases (price 
increase up to price cap after introduction of the heat law). Many consumer complaints concern 
price, in particular a lack of transparency and clarity in pricing (FEI, 2013; Which?, 2015). “Many 
consumers lacked confidence that they were paying a fair and accurate price for their heating” 
(Which?, 2015, p 10).  
Information asymmetry could decrease the effectiveness of regulation. The DH companies tend to 
have a knowledge advantage over to the supervisory body and the government, who still need to 
build expertise on the heat market (Jansen, 2014). 
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Possible causes: market power, information asymmetry, incompleteness of regulation 
Possible solutions: split-up in infrastructure and supply (like electricity and gas) as an independent 
and transparent grid operator advocates the public interest, standardized bills to improve clarity, 
independent benchmark on all heating alternatives, (additional) regulation, central service/complaint 
organization and access to ombudsman services, price responsiveness (dynamic pricing), making 
other heating alternative more available as an alternative (e.g. heat pumps).  
 
Note: price elasticity  
Market power can be reduced by a high price elasticity and availability of alternatives. Price elasticity shows the 
responsiveness of a consumers to the change in price of the product. A study of Li et al (2015) has shown that 
the demand for DH shows a relatively low price elasticity. Cross-price elasticity of DH shows the responsiveness 
of demand for DH to the change in the price of a heating alternative. The cross-price elasticity of DH is 
influenced by “the availability of alternative heating systems and the switching costs between different 
systems” (Li et al, 2015). Availability of alternative heating systems can thus decrease market power.  
1.3 Problem 3: Long-term contracts 
Issues: District heating networks are capital intensive and often have long pay-back times. This 
requires long-term commitment of all parties involved: the network owner, the heat supplying firm 
and the consumers. This commitment contradicts interests of the stakeholders in many cases. 
Potential heat supplying firms, in particular waste heat, are reluctant to commit to long-term 
contracts as their operation processes do not have such a long time horizon. For consumers, being 
bound to only one heating solution for many years without the possibility of switching to other 
heating alternatives, is considered a large disadvantage.  
Possible causes: locality of heat. 
Possible solutions: allowing competition (open networks), flexible contracts. 
1.4 Problem 4: Lock-in of gas  
Issues: Almost every household in the Netherlands is connected to gas infrastructure. Gas heating 
provides a cheap and comfortable form of heating. Incentives are lacking for consumers to switch to 
alternative heating systems, such as district heating.  
On the network side, district heating needs to compete with gas infrastructure. Triple infrastructure 
(electricity, gas, heat) is expensive. It is hard to break the lock-in of gas infrastructure, especially in 
the existing built environment. Costs for the construction of a district heating network could be 
‘socialized’ in which costs are divided among all users, instead of only the local users. This is also the 
case with gas and electricity and creates a more equal level of competition. 
Possible causes: power of the incumbents, network externalities. 
Possible solutions: A better chain integration of energy infrastructures would allow grid operators for 
instance to decide between renovating gas networks or replacing it by a heat network (Connecting 
different energy infrastructures (hybrid energy networks) to utilize each commodity best at each 
location could also be a strategy to break lock-in), socializing district heating networks.  
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1.5 Problem 5: Investments in the network   
Issues: District heating networks are associated with high investments costs and long payback times. 
Currently, most district heating networks are owned and operated by commercial parties. Relatively 
high rate of returns of commercial parties may increase district heating costs and create an unequal 
comparison with gas infrastructure which is owned by semi-commercial organizations under 
government regulation. New actors such as grid operators water companies may act as 
(independent) network operators. Direct interference of a local governments would also be effective 
to keep network costs low. 
Possible causes: Insufficient feasibility of heat networks (no market failure), government failure to 
ensure sufficient energy infrastructure. 
Possible solutions: improvement of the investment environment (cost reductions) and firm’s 
competitive advantage, strengthening of formation of clusters and cascading (Kamp, 2015) (In the 
industrial context a community infrastructure and with central control could be a good business 
model); open networks with multiple producers to eliminate the issue of long-term guarantees.  
1.6 Problem 6: Value of heat 
Issues: In the Netherlands, the heat price is related to the gas price instead of real costs due to a 
price cap based on the gas price (NMDA tariff). The foundation of the heat price in the gas price 
means that there is also an energy tax component included, which is not justified for district heating 
based on energy efficient production and sustainable sources (Kamp, 2015). Also, the benchmark for 
the SDE+ subsidy and the feasibility of the energy savings and investments are based on gas. The 
costs of the purchase and maintenance of a gas fired boiler are usually not taken into account in the 
comparison between heat and gas. In conclusion, the social costs and benefits in the heat chain can 
insufficiently be expressed in the heat price. Policy instruments should be used to internalize these 
impacts in the heat price. The implementation of such policy instruments would motivate DH 
companies to switch to “Green Heat” (Li et al, 2015).  
 
Possible causes: externalities, regulation fails/is insufficient, price model not suitable. 
Possible solutions: Internalizing externalities: alternative policy instruments for valuing CO2 emission 
reductions (other than the EU ETS system), valuing avoided gas infrastructure investments, 
transparent comparison between real cost of gas and heat, increasing the tax on CO2 emission. 
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2. Identification of customer satisfaction and needs  
 
In this section, international experiences of existing and developing DHN are used in order to gain 
understanding in the needs and expectations of customers. This will eventually enable the 
development of new business model concepts that better comply with customer needs and 
expectations. In Scandinavia, where the district heating sector is much larger than in the 
Netherlands, a number of researches have been conducted on customer satisfaction. In growing 
district heating countries, like United Kingdom and the Netherlands, these type of studies are also 
available. In this section the results of these studies will be summarized and their parallels will be 
found. Some studies that will be used: 
 Finland: Finish Energy Industries, 2013. Strategy for the district heating sector. Sector Study 
on strategies for DHN. Report is based on interviews with the sector’s interest 
groups, a member survey, recent analyses concerning and surveys charting customer 
satisfaction and customer orientation.  
 UK: Which?, 2015. Turning up the heat: getting a fair deal for district heating users. Study 
from a consumer organization based on customer surveys and interviews. 
 Finland: Ahvenniemi, H. and Klobut, K., 2014. Future Services for District Heating Solutions in 
Residential Districts. Academic paper on customer preferences. 
 NL: Van Lidth de Jeude & Midden, 2014. Veronderstellingen eindgebruikers collectieve 
warmtelevering Rotterdam. Consultancy study on customer preferences;  
 NL: Janssen, B., 2015. De consument en de collectieve warmtevoorziening. Thesis on 
customer satisfaction based on surveys and data from various consumer organizations. 
In Scandinavia, where district heating covers a much larger share of heat supply, there is a growing 
awareness for the role of the customer in new business development. A lack of flexibility and clarity 
in pricing weakens the image of district heating and leads to poorer customer satisfaction (FEI, 2013). 
Studies have been conducted on customer satisfaction in existing district heating networks and the 
needs and expectations in future district heating networks (FEI, 2013; Ahvenniemi & Klobut, 2014). 
Those studies found that in order to stay competitive with other heating alternatives, district heating 
companies need to find new ways of utilizing heat and new applications. “Companies need the ability 
and will to find applications on their customers’ behalf and ways in which they can save energy or 
improve the prospects of increasing the value of their business activities” (FEI, 2013). In order to 
retain competitiveness, district heating companies need to develop new business and service models 
(Ahvenniemi & Klobut, 2014). An approach in which all customers get the same product no longer 
suffices. Traditional district heating does not sufficiently take into account preferences and needs of 
different customers. The literature review will reveal the values that customer that are considered as 
important or that are considered as key in the development of DHN by the DH sector. This will 
provide us with a ‘checklist of values’.  
2.1 Price 
The customer satisfaction surveys studied in the context of this report indicate that consumers of DH 
networks are highly sensitive to price. The report of the Finish Energy Industries (2013) mentions 
unclear pricing as one of the main reasons for a weakened image and poorer customer satisfaction: 
“Practices related to pricing and its transparency are criticized”. The study of Ecofy (2014) on 
10 
 
assumptions of consumers of DH systems concludes that the attitude of non-users is to a great 
extent determined by the assumptions on the price and control on the price. Among consumers of 
DH networks included in the study no one assumes that he or she profits financially. Rather, the 
majority believes that district heating is more expensive than a gas-fired heating system. Also the 
study of Janssen (2015) concludes that consumers believe that district heating is more expensive 
than gas. Most complaints reported in this study are on the height of tariffs.  
 
Also the British consumer body Which? (2015) points out that in various DH networks price was the 
overriding issue in consumer satisfaction surveys. As a result of a lack of transparency in how prices 
are derived and clarity of the billing (see 2.4) consumers lack confidence that they were paying a fair 
and accurate price (Which?, 2015). Obviously, without the right information it is difficult to make 
informed decisions on whether pricing is fair (Which?, 2015). 
 
In customer satisfaction surveys (Which, 2015; Van Lidth de Jeude & Midden, 2014; Janssen, 2015) 
customers repeatedly mention the monopolistic position of the DH company as the source of 
suspicion that the price they pay for the heat is too much. It is striking that many consumers indicate 
a too high price whereas they are not actually able to check the bill and compare this with other 
heating alternatives. This presumes that there is a relation between the perception of fair prices on 
the one hand and trust and transparency on the other hand. 
 
The price structure is also a point of debate. High standing charges easily gives consumers the idea 
that they are paying too much (Van Lidth de Jeude & Midden, 2014). In schemes with considerable 
standing charges1, consumers with low usage consider price as unfair as standing charges even 
exceed the users unit rate (Which?, 2015).  Consumers sometimes also consider district heating as 
not sustainable because high fixed rate compared to the relatively small users rate does not 
stimulate energy efficiency (Janssen, 2015).  
2.2 Comfort 
Comfort is generally seen as an advantage of district heating networks. It is considered to be a 
reliable, safe and low maintenance technology (Van Lidth de Jeude & Midden, 2014; Ahvenniemi & 
Klobut, 2014). In an overview notifications to the Dutch association of homeowners (Vereniging 
Eigen Huis) consumers of DH systems report positively about comfort among the many complaints in 
the other areas (including price and trust). Apart from a lack of performance in old systems most 
dissatisfaction is caused by a lack of control over the temperature in the house which leads to 
discomfort. Which? (2015) reports a lack of control in both old and new systems. 
For existing houses connected to a new DH network, the level of comfort is not necessarily improved. 
When central heating in housing blocks or flats is replaced with district heating, the physical layout of 
the building is not changed. Complaints on the current system may affect the attitude of tenants 
towards the DH networks. The attitude towards comfort seems to be related to the quality of the 
installation and the housing situation in combination with the need for comfort (Van Lidth de Jeude 
& Midden, 2014). Poor insulation levels, low radiator capacity and overdue maintenance are all 
                                                          
1 In the Dutch social housing sector a ratio of 35% fixed component and 65% users component in central 
heating systems is common. The heat law prescribes a maximum fixed standing charge.  
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issues that influence the perception of comfort with the new district heating system. Not taking 
these issues in account when developing the district heating system may cause dissatisfaction in the 
future. 
2.3 Transparency  
The customer satisfaction survey executed by the British consumer body Which? (2015) identified 
the lack of transparency on pricing as one the most important factors of dissatisfaction among DH 
consumers. It is often not clear to consumers how the price of heating is constructed and it cannot 
be checked whether the calculated price is correct. “Suppliers should provide transparent and 
standardized bills with a full breakdown of costs, and an easy-to-use and reliable heat price 
comparator to allow customers to compare their bills with alternative heating systems” (Which?, 
2015: p3). Metering systems can be reason for a lack of transparency in many schemes. People for 
example don’t understand the evaporation meters on radiators and the distribution of costs in 
unmetered schemes. Many consumers are unable to check and understand the quantity of heat that 
is billed.  
Another drawback is the fact that it is not easy for consumers to compare the DH system with other 
heating alternatives. Many are feeling worse off than with a gas-fired heating system or other 
heating alternatives (Van Lidth de Jeude & Midden, 2014; Janssen, 2015). Even though the heat law 
that was recently introduced in the Netherlands, which should ensure that customers do not to pay 
more than with conventional gas-fired heating, it seems not to increase trust. Janssen (2015) shows 
that the majority of the respondents (Dutch consumers of DH systems) included in this survey do not 
to feel protected by this law. Rather, the majority of the respondents indicate to have little faith in 
the energy supplier/DH company and more than half of the respondents prefers to switch to other 
heating alternatives. 
The DH companies are accused of giving evasive and contradictory information (Janssen, 2015; 
Which?, 2015). Eventually a lack of transparent information can lead to mistrust towards the DH 
company. In some cases it puts DH companies in such a bad light that consumers feel forced to seek 
legal redress.  
A lack of transparent information in some cases leads to unjustified assumptions regarding the 
district heating company. Some consumers seem to think that DH companies make substantial 
profits, whereas the sector itself claims to struggle with profitability (Janssen, 2015). For consumers it 
not understandable that the heat price in DH networks with ‘cheap’ waste heat is so high. Consumers 
have also mentioned the suspicion that houses connected to district heating are deliberately and 
without knowledge of consumers less well insulated, bringing heating costs up. Those assumptions 
shed a bed light over the district heating sector. Transparency goes hand in hand with the feeling of 
control and trust. The rigid and inflexible image of district heating is likely to be improved by 
increased openness and transparency on how prices are established and how bills are constructed.   
2.4 Sustainability 
DH networks can be a cost-efficient measure to achieve CO2 emission reduction in the built 
environment. Whereas municipalities, housing corporations and other parties with public interest 
consider the possibility of DH networks because of the sustainability in terms in CO2 emission 
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reductions, building- or home-owners often have many different considerations when considering a 
heating system. Studies show that environmental considerations are generally the least decisive 
factors (Ahvenniemi & Klobut, 2014; Mahapatra & Gustavsson,2009). “As several earlier studies 
have pointed out it seems that even if the environmental awareness is increasing it still does not 
play a remarkable role in households’ decision making” (Ahvenniemi & Klobut, 2014, p136). 
Factors that are weighed more heavily are reliability, safety, comfort, heating costs and easiness of 
the installation. 
Sustainability is not experienced in the same way and consumers do not always consider the DH 
network to be sustainable. The utilization of industrial waste heat is, despite of the environmental 
benefits, considered not sustainable as it is still based on fossil resources (Janssen, 2015; Van Lidth de 
Jeude & Midden, 2014). The environmental underpinning seems hard to explain and ‘sell’ to 
consumers. Even if environmental benefits are clear to consumers, it is not necessarily contributing 
to the attractiveness of district heating as a heating alternative. Some people are aware that the 
costs of the environmental benefits are brought up by only a small group of users, while the 
environmental benefits stretch much wider. This is considered as unfair. In the communication with 
the customer, the environmental consequences of district heating operations are given a lot of 
space, while the financial aspects and the direct customer benefit of district heating are not 
emphasized to any particularly great degree (Fellesson & Johnson, 2009).  
District heating pipes are constantly loaded with hot water. This is also the case in summer when 
heat demand is centered around morning and evening peak for sanitary purposes or when only one 
user in a flat consumes hot water. This is a visible effect for consumer that they often consider as not 
efficient or sustainable (Van Lidth de Jeude & Midden, 2014).  
2.5 Flexibility and consumer choice 
The various customer satisfaction researches report a distrust of consumers towards the district 
heating company. This is partly powered by the fact that the consumers does not have free choice 
and cannot change suppliers (Janssen, 2015). Consumers of a DH system cannot switch suppliers for 
two reasons 1) the DH network is often a natural monopoly, meaning that there is only one supplier 
of district heat, and 2) alternative heating technologies are often out of league because costs are 
significantly higher (such as electrical heating) or technically not a possibility because the (gas) 
infrastructure is absent in district heated areas. Even if the consumer chooses not to use the DH 
system, the standing charge for the district heating still needs to be paid.  
One of the consequences of not being able to switch suppliers is that consumers do not have the 
possibility to choose for the supplier that offers the best deal or profit from regular client discount. 
Although consumers of DH networks are also regular customers, they do not profit from it, neither 
do they have the advantages of non-regular customers. They can also not take part in promotions or 
collective purchase programs (Janssen, 2015). On the contrary, the district heating company may 
even take advantage of their guaranteed customer base and won’t deliver good service or reduce 
bills through efficiency improvements (Which?, 2015). 
In addition, consumers have little influence on the cost. The lack of flexibility is inherent to DH 
networks, but the extent to which it leads to distrust and dissatisfaction vary highly among different 
DH networks. 
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To sum up, the factors related to flexibility that contribute to a feeling of distrust and dissatisfaction 
are: 
1. Not being able to switch suppliers 
2. Not having influence on the price 
The strength of district heating has been a reliable, robust product that is cost-efficient at the same 
time. Across Europe, this is still the main driver for its success. But it is also applied to all customers in 
the same way, something that no longer suffices to keep up with the competition of other heating 
alternatives:  “The majority of customers are satisfied with the basic product but, on the other hand, 
the same kind of product is no longer sufficient for the needs of all customers” (FEI, 2013). Adaptation 
of features to customer requirements is suggested to adapt to changing needs. To improve the image 
of inflexibility and stand out from the competition, district heating companies should make changes 
in their practice that are visible to customers, including more openness.  
2.6 Consumer protection  
Which? (2015) has identified a poor customer service and complaints handling procedures as 
important factors for customer dissatisfaction. Customers are not sufficiently heard and helped when 
there is a complaint. Not only do they receive poor customer service, there is no central point of 
contact with whom they can take their complaint forward (Which? 2015). There is often no 
organization taking responsibility nor is there a central ombudsman to resolve complaints. 
Consumers feel trapped because no matter how dissatisfied they are, they cannot switch. Resistance 
can be fierce: conflicts between the district heating company and the consumer have in some cases 
resulted in legal procedures in the Netherlands and even the establishment an action group in a 
specific situation (Tilburg Reeshof).  
Considering the monopolistic position of the district heating company, customer protection is 
especially important. In the Netherlands a main form of customer protection is through the heat law 
that should protect the customer from monopoly pricing and should guarantee reasonable practice 
for the technical performance of the system. Janssen (2015) has in his study concluded that heat 
consumers feel not sufficiently protected by the heat law. The heat law does not sufficiently provide 
minimal quality standards that are legally enforced and controlled. Overall, there has been criticism 
to the functioning of this law ever since its introduction in 2014. However, a discussion of the heat 
law goes beyond the scope of this research note. Next to protection by the heat law, guaranteed 
performance standards and access to independent and binding redress are fundamental bedrocks for 
a credible customer protection framework (Which?, 2015). A lack such protection leaves many 
consumers with district heating feeling vulnerable and powerless.  
2.7 Service products 
It is common for district heating companies to offer normal maintenance services, but little do offer  
additional services. In order to stay competitive, researchers have suggested that district heating 
companies should develop new heating related services (Ahvenniemi & Klobut, 2014). The district 
heating company can offer a wider range of products which will strengthen the competitiveness of 
the core product and increase customer satisfaction. This diversification can be seen as a more 
customer oriented approach and is a basis for strengthening the long-term relation with the 
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customer. “External research on customer satisfaction clearly demonstrates that customers are more 
satisfied when energy companies provide additional services” (Euroheat&Power, 2011). In business in 
general, economic value creation though services linked to physical products is an ongoing trend (FEI, 
2013).  
 
The new products offered are typically services related to management of energy use at different 
stages of the customer lifecycle, or technical add-on devices to be linked to the heating system (FEI, 
2013). Also flexible services and solutions are seen as a new opportunity for district heating 
companies. The study of Ahvenniemi & Klobut (2014) identified interest among consumers for the 
following service products:  
• Energy consumption monitoring service; 
• Internet service enabling comparison of different heating methods scored; 
• Heating system as a "keys-in-the-hand service". 
Service products are not essential customer needs but can be used to increase the attractiveness of 
the DH system. Offering information sharing services such as the first two options can be a way of 
increasing transparency and customer trust. All inclusive “keys-in-the-hand service” can be an 
effective way of lowering the barrier for home-owners to adopt the DH system. In more technical 
terms one can think of offering cold next to heat, all energy commodities in one contract 
(Euroheat&Power, 2011) or to offer solar heating connected to the primary DH system (Ahvenniemi 
&Klobut, 2014). There are many more opportunities for creating service products that lower the 
barriers to adopting DH systems and increase customer satisfaction.   
2.8 Conclusions/instruments 
In the Netherlands, district heating suffers from a bad image of old block heating systems. Both 
Dutch and UK studies report complaints on the technical performance of the DH system, both in old 
and new systems. This is remarkable as in Scandinavia high technical performance (comfort, 
reliability, etc.) has led to a wide acceptance of the technology and to its success. Multiple studies 
have identified district heating as a technology with relatively high attractiveness (only heat pumps 
score better). The Scandinavian studies do not (strongly) report complaints on technical 
performance.  It can be concluded that traditional strengths of district heating such as easiness, 
comfort, good operation reliability and stability of costs should be highlighted when marketing 
district heating to potential customers (Ahvenniemi & Klobut, 2014). A good deal highlights these 
strengths and makes sure that there are instruments in place to monitor and guarantee these 
strengths.  
 
A lack of trust, mainly caused by a lack of transparency, is a large issue for district heating companies 
across Europe. This is related to the monopolistic position of the DH company. Many consumers are 
feeling worse off than with gas heating. This might be merely a trust issue rather than rational proof 
that DH is more expensive or a consumer pays indeed  more compared to gas heating. First of all, 
customers of a DH system must actually get a fair deal, and the information concerning prices must 
be understandable and communicated clearly. Customers must be provided with information to 
make informed decision on whether pricing is fair. Monitoring prices and a benchmark tool for 
comparing between different heating alternatives are suggested (“An independent, tailored and 
easy-to-use heat price comparator should be developed for all home owners and tenants connected 
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to a district heat network” (FEI, 2013)). Secondly, the solution must be focused on building trust. 
District heating companies across Europe are seen as inflexible and defensive. The weakening of the 
image can be remedied through better customer communications and PR (FEI, 2013). The position of 
district heating must be strengthened through openness and a more customer-oriented way of doing 
business. Informative events such as excursions to the heat production facility are organized by 
district heating companies to contribute to the process of building customer relations (for example 
NUON and Natuurlijk Ijburg).  
In summary: 
1. Emphasize the strengths of district heating  
2. Make sure customers really get a good deal 
3. Provide the information to prove it 
4. Build a strong relationship with the customer by openness and good customer service 
5. Use service products to create a more customer-oriented business 
A preliminary checklist contains the following values and hypothesis: 
 
Value Non-users 
Expected outcome 
(hypothesis) 
Users 
Expected outcome 
(hypothesis) 
Heat price 
 
Sensitivity high to very high, 
behavioral expectations 
medium 
Sensitivity high, behavioral 
expectations low 
Level of comfort of the indoor climate  
 
Sensitivity relatively low, 
relevance in modern DH 
systems lower 
 
Service products offered linked to the 
physical products 
 
Sensitivity low Sensitivity medium 
Transparency in pricing 
 
Sensitivity medium Sensitivity high 
Sustainability 
 
Sensitivity low Sensitivity low 
Flexibility (switch suppliers or other heating 
alternatives) 
 
Sensitivity high Sensitivity high 
Consumer choice (different products) Sensitivity medium Sensitivity medium 
Independent platform/consumer 
association 
Sensitivity medium Sensitivity medium 
 
Table 1. Set of values of consumers towards district heating networks 
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3. Strategy 1: Increasing competition by third party access 
 
Open networks are gaining attention as a way to increase the attractiveness of district heating to 
consumers. Open networks allow for more competition on the networks, which are expected to lead 
to increased cost efficiency, transparency and consumer choice and eventually higher customer 
satisfaction. There have been several studies on the concept of open networks and third party 
access. First, we will zoom in on this concept and expound the possible market models and expected 
benefits from those models. Next, we will elaborate on the concept of dynamic pricing which is 
introduced in the Flexiheat project, as a specific solution for an open network with higher cost 
efficiency.  
3.1 Third party access: disconnecting the value chain 
As explained in section 1.2, district heating networks are natural monopolies that have a very local 
and integrated nature. Production and distribution of the network is traditionally vertically 
integrated, with one district heating company responsible operating the entire chain including 
production, supply and distribution (Söderholm & Warell, 2011; PWC, 2015). This can lead to 
monopoly pricing. Third Party Access (TPA) refers to the regulation of access of parties not being the 
network operator to the network, either as supplier or producer. TPA can be used as a policy tool to 
address the market failure of imperfect competition. TPA potentially leads to two main advantages 
for consumers: 1) choice of retailer or producer and 2) lowering of costs. To allow third parties to 
enter the network, different market models need to be considered in which production and 
distribution are disconnected to enable competition. By this disconnection, district heating networks 
will show more resemblance with gas and electricity networks after the liberalization of those 
markets. Many different models have been studied by various authors (Söderholm & Warell, 2011; 
PWC, 2015; Dervis & Nierop, 2015; Ouden, Hoeksema & Graafland, 2015). We will now explain the 
different possible conceptual models studied by the aforementioned authors.  
 
3.2 TPA models 
Regulated TPA 
Regulated TPA is meant to ensure unlimited access of third parties to the network in a non-
discriminatory way. The model requires a full vertical separation of distribution and production in 
order to create fair competition between different producers and retailers. The conditions for access 
to the network are determined ex ante. In theory, regulated TPA would stimulate competition on 
production and supply and thus lead to a more efficient operation. More production sources could 
lead to flexibility to deploy production sources at the right time, which is expected to increase the 
efficiency of production (PWC, 2015). However, the efficiency increase depends on the size of the 
market and the number of competing firms (Söderholm & Warell, 2011).  
 
On the downside, extensive regulation will be needed to allow competition. The separation of 
distribution and supply creates competition on the production and supply side, but the distribution 
remains a natural monopoly and price regulation will be needed to address the network operations. 
As a result of the separation the tariff will have to be split between a fixed tariff for the network and 
a variable tariff for the consumption of heat. District heating costs will increase for users with low use 
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as the fixed tariff will increase because part of the network costs are currently incorporated in the 
variable tariff. 
 
In the most radical form of regulated TPA there is an independent grid operator which allows 
independent investment decisions on the network as well as equal competition between producers 
and suppliers because there is no longer an integrated district heating company with a stronger 
competitive position compared to third parties. Producers and suppliers can make bilateral 
agreements on the price and volume of heat to be delivered. Under attention is also an independent 
trade platform similar to the APX/ENDEX for electricity (Dervis & Nierop, 2015). Such a platform will 
allow an optimal dispatch of the available production capacity. However, it can be questioned to 
what extent to functioning of such as market is realistic for district heating due to the locality of 
production units. As a result of this free market, the grid operator needs to be responsible for 
security of supply, i.e. contracting back-up capacity.  
 
Box 1. Dynamic pricing 
Regulated TPA using an independent network operator and a market place offers the possibility of 
dynamic pricing. The concept of dynamic pricing has been studied in the Flexiheat project. The aim of 
dynamic pricing is to find the optimum dispatch of different production units in the network while 
satisfying consumer needs. It requires a control of the network through ‘distributed controllers’ that 
use producers’ cost curves and consumers’ utility functions to calculate the optimal operation. 
Buffers are used to increase the optimization possibilities by shifting loads in time. The algorithm 
developed in Flexiheat allows the modelling of different levels of price sensitiveness of consumers 
and producers: fixed (price inelastic) users, price driven users and controllable users.  
Dynamic pricing offers several advantages over standard regulated TPA. First of all, it allows overall 
optimization of the network. Dynamic pricing can also help in terms of security of supply since there 
is an incentive for multiple producers to compensate for shortages in supply. However, there might 
be situations in which the maximum heat price is reached while not satisfying the total demand. In 
these cases a responsible party is still necessary to balance demand and supply. 
For more information see (Scholten, De Persis and Tesi, 2015)  
 
Negotiated TPA 
In a negotiated TPA model, the access of third parties to the network is negotiated between the new 
producer and the existing district heating company (also being the network operator). The conditions 
for access to the network are set ex post. These negotiations can be mandatory or voluntary (Dervis 
& Nierop, 2015). The established company has a stronger position in the negotiations than the new 
producer compared to regulated TPA (Söderholm & Warell, 2011; PWC, 2015). One of the 
advantages of negotiated TPA is that local conditions can be taken into account, it is still possible to 
accomplish system optimization by the integrated producer/supplies/distributer.  
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Single buyer model 
An alternative for negotiated and regulated TPA with a less open market, yet allowing production 
competition on the network, is the single buyer model. This is also the dominant model in district 
heating networks. The single buyer model allows competition of production. However, there is still 
one integrated distributor/supplier (the single buyer) and consumers have no free choice of retailer 
(Dervis & Nierop, 2015). In this model, the new producers cannot sell directly to the consumers 
whereas the single buyer purchases contracted volumes of heat from the producers and sells it to 
the consumers. Like in negotiated TPA, the transportation and system costs are negotiated 
separately (Söderholm & Warell, 2011). This could lead to a situation of information asymmetry as 
the established district heating company has the information on systems costs that the third parties 
do not.  
Extended producer market 
Söderholm & Warell (2011) describe a TPA model that has an extended producer market. Heat is 
bought and sold between the network operator and different production units, but there remains to 
be one district heating company for the supply and distribution. The value chain is vertically 
separated to the extent of splitting the activities of one integrated company in distribution and 
supply activities. This will lead to increased transparency about the prices charged. The aim of the 
model is to create market incentives by making information on costs and risks in each part of the 
value chain visible (PWC, 2015). This will stimulates benchmark competition among different 
networks.  
TPA for retailers  
 
In fact, regulated and negotiated TPA allow third parties to not only have access to the network, but 
also to sell directly to the final consumers. Yet, a form of TPA focused on opening the retail side of 
the value chain can be discussed as a separate model (Darvis & Nierop, 2015; Ouden, Hoeksema & 
Graafland, 2015). An integrated producer/distributor gives third parties access to the network, but 
does not function as a single buyer as there is now retail competition. As a result, consumers can 
now choose their own retailer. This model is common in the telecom sector. However, retail 
competition will only lead to lower district heat prices with sufficient retailers. Also, there is not 
necessarily competition of production as well. As long as there is not also competition of production, 
the effect on prices will be limited. Darvis & Nierop (2015) conclude that TPA for retailers probably 
has only small positive effects on district heating prices, partly because of limited competition of 
production. The prices may even lead to higher costs due to efficiency losses in case each retailer has 
an individual supply obligation to the consumers and should therefore provide back-up capacity each 
individually.  
3.3 District heating characteristics limiting the prospects of TPA 
Inefficiencies in a separated value chain 
TPA has already been successfully introduced in gas and electricity networks. When assessing the 
prospects of introducing TPA in district heating networks, one should take into account the specific 
characteristics of district heating networks. Unlike gas and electricity, district heating networks are 
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closed systems in which the return temperature effects the performance of the production units and 
the efficiency of the supply chain as a whole. However, it is unknown which consumers effect which 
production units in a TPA network and what incentives there are to lower the temperatures 
(Söderholm & Warell, 2011). This could lead to problems with the system optimization and a loss of 
synergy (PWC, 2015). Additionally, parameters such as the pressure, flow and temperature vary over 
the network. This variation increases difficulties of connecting a new production unit at an optimal 
efficiency level (Darvis & Nierop, 2015). These technical issues with supply chain optimization and 
economic inefficiencies are a result of externalities, a market failure in which negative side effects of 
production are insufficiently incorporated in the price of the product (Söderholm & Warell, 2011). 
Those can internalized by means of contracts between the network operator and the producers. In 
conclusion, TPA could lead to increased costs for operating the system as a result of dependencies in 
the supply chain. Separation could lead to technical difficulties, inefficiencies and thus higher costs.  
 
Locality of heat sources 
Even though multiple producers are desired in the district heating network as competition will be 
increased, it is still the question to what extent there will indeed be sufficient production units 
available and able to operate efficiently. District heating networks are, unlike gas and electricity, 
highly local in nature. Heat cannot be transported over large distances because heat losses during 
the distribution will lead to high efficiency losses. Therefore, only potential production units that are 
close to the end consumers will be feasible. This highly limits the availability of additional production 
sources and thus limits the possibilities for production competition. It must be noted that TPA may 
offer good possibilities for small waste heat sources and renewable energy sources to enter the 
network.  
 
Natural monopolies 
Even though TPA should lead to more competition and therefore to less market power of the 
monopolist, the position of established district heating companies forms a barrier to TPA at the same 
time. In many TPA models, the access of third parties is to some extent voluntarily. The vertically 
integrated district heating company often lacks financial incentives to allow other heat suppliers. In 
practice this leads to very limited access of third parties despite of the policies in place.  
 
Due to the characteristics of district heating networks, a monopolistic, vertically integrated district 
heating company is not necessary less efficient that a network operated with TPA, especially when it 
is operated by a local government on a cost-covering basis. The risk exists that a cost-covering 
monopolist might be replaced by a profit-maximizing monopolist when TPA is introduced. 
 
International examples 
A study of PWC (2015) compared international examples of district heating networks that allow some 
form of TPA. Included are the district heating networks of Kopenhagen, München, Stockholm and 
Warschau. The study concludes that there are no real examples of functioning TPA on district heating 
networks. Only the networks in Kopenhagen and Warschau have multiple active producers on the 
basis of regulated TPA, but a completely free network access does not really occur. There has been 
an extensive discussion on market opening in Sweden from mandatory negotiated TPA to regulated 
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TPA. Two governmental investigations have led to the conclusions that the introduced negotiated 
TPA has not have the desired effect and that the costs of a separation of production and distribution 
necessary for regulated TPA exceeds the benefits (Darvis & Nierop, 2015).  
3.4 Conclusions  
From the studied literature it becomes evident that there are many concerns around introducing TPA 
in district heating networks. One of the main issues is the fact that increased competition does not 
necessarily lead to lower prices. Instead, TPA may even lead to higher consumer prices. “Although 
there may only be some small positive effects on the competition may have a significant impact on 
the possibility to run the system in a cost-effective manner” (Söderholm & Warell, 2011). This mainly 
has to do with inefficiencies in the operation of the system as a result of the locality of the network 
and the interdependency of production and distribution. Another important point is that natural 
monopolies are not easily changed into competitive markets, for the reasons mentioned above. This 
has also become clear from the fact that there are limited international examples. TPA requires 
extensive regulation and monitoring. The costs associated with this will need to be outweighed by 
the positive effects.  
 
Multiple the studies conclude that the effectiveness of TPA depends on the size and location of the 
network and are therefore expected to have the best prospects for large-scale district heating 
systems (Söderholm & Warell, 2011; PWC, 2015).  
 
Even though regulation may in theory be softened or even abandoned in case of more market 
competition, most studies conclude that price regulation will still be needed because of the expected 
limited availability of third parties. When there is one or more market failures associated with the 
network, which is the case in a natural monopoly, opening of the market through TPA may not be 
desirable. Instead, price regulation may be more effective to lower district heating prices. Söderholm 
& Warell (2011) conclude that in case of natural monopolies “a price regulation may be the only 
option to protect consumers from being charged monopoly prices”.   
 
Free choice of a retailer does not seem realistic considering the characteristics of district heating 
networks (Darvis & Nierop, 2015). Retail competition does not easily lead to lower costs, as most 
costs are determined by the (limited variety in) production capacity and network costs. 
 
The following policy suggestions follow from the studied literature:  
- One uniform TPA solution could easily lead to inefficiencies in many networks considering 
the large variation of networks. Setting minimum conditions for access to the network would 
however be a good suggestion. 
- When introducing a form of TPA, the technical criteria, economic feasibility and process need 
to be become clear. 
- As an alternative to the aforementioned TPA models, an administrative separation of  
production and distribution would already lead to more transparency and a better 
competitive position of third parties (producers), as is for example the case in an extended 
producer market. 
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4. Strategy 2: More consumer choice by introducing price models  
 
Lack of choice and high district heating prices have been identified as one of the most important 
reasons for customer dissatisfaction. These are direct results of the fact that district heating 
networks are natural monopolies. In the previous section we have looked into the possibility of 
abolishing the monopolistic position of the integrated district heating company by introducing TPA. 
Another approach to increasing choice and lowering costs can be sought in the introduction of 
alternative price models.  
4.1 Pricing models 
A pricing model is structure of how the price the district heating company charges the consumers is 
structured. There is a strong need to develop a new pricing mechanisms in order to strengthen the 
competitive position and promote sustainable development of DH systems (Li et al, 2015).  
 
Price components 
In the Dutch system there are three components: connection fee (in Dutch: bijdrage 
aansluitingskosten), standing charge (in Dutch: vastrecht) and variable energy costs (GJ price). The 
main reason there is a preference for a fixed charge is that heat demand is greatly variable over a 
year, and a high proportion of the operating costs of a DH system don't change in a short run 
(Lasrsson, 2011). A high fixed component can reduce the risk for the producer that is caused by 
fluctuations in consumption. As total costs remain the same in different fixed-variable fee 
compositions, the higher the fixed charge is, the lower the unit cost of heat consumption becomes. 
There is recently more attention for a price model with only a variable fee to support energy 
efficiency measure and to make consumers feel more in control about the heat price. Larsson (2011) 
shows the effect of different compositions of price models on the impact of energy efficiency 
measures. Apart from the three components mentioned, the study includes several other price 
components (table). Obviously, high fixed costs leads to lower incentives for energy efficiency 
measures. A solution could be to set multiple variable unit costs for consumers to choose from.  
 
Price component Description 
Fix A fully fixed cost, independent of energy use, price/year 
Fix (prev) A cost which is fixed for the current year but is based on previous 
years’ consumption and therefore ultimately variable, price/MWh 
Energy The energy cost in price/MWh 
Category Capacity cost based on category number, a number of hours 
determining the subscribed capacity of a certain type of 
customer. In most cases the total annual consumption is used, but 
there are also cases where the winter consumption determines 
the subscribed capacity, price/kW 
Measured Capacity cost based on measurement, price/kW 
Flow Flow cost, price/m3 
 
Table 2. Price components (Larsson, 2011)  
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Prices models with high variable cost stimulate an overall lower energy consumption, but do not 
form an incentive to reduce peak loads. The study also concludes that pricing models including 
seasonal pricing, measured capacity or capacity based on winter consumption provide increased 
incentive for peak load reduction. The extent to which the incentive actually leads to increased 
energy efficiency is however another field of study. 
 
Cost methods 
Different methods exist to determine district heating prices, mainly categorized in Cost based pricing 
and alternative pricing.  Marginal pricing – deregulated market – fuel costs (and thus marginal costs) 
vary through seasons: variations in the tariffs of DH reflect the fluctuations in energy cost. A full 
explanation of marginal cost pricing method falls beyond the scope of this research note. Interested 
readers are referred to (Li et al., 2015). 
4.2 Flexible pricing options for consumer choice 
Heat is seen as a homogenous product with limited prospects for differentiation. However, 
differentiating a commodity offers the prospect of increased profitability by designing variations of 
the commodity that meet the specific needs of different customer segments (Martensson & 
Frederiksen, 2006). As district heating has a high degree of local market penetration, the commodity 
should be offered in a wide range of variants to attract all those different customers by meeting their 
specific needs and preferences. Heterogeneous customer segment… 
Several options for differentiating can be identified: 
1. Cost structure: different weighting of connection fee, fixed and variable costs; 
2. Different price structure for different buildings; 
3. Differentiating in price to capacity; 
4. Different prices according to sustainability of the product; 
5. Differentiating through extended service offers. 
4.2.1 Cost structure 
 
Weighting fixed and variable cost 
Traditionally the price structure of district heating companies consisted of a significant fixed tariff 
and variable energy costs. There is increasing attention for price structure with a large or full variable 
tariff. This has two main advantages: 1) there is an incentive for energy efficiency measures and 2) it 
gives consumers a higher feeling of control of the heat price. Disadvantageous are mainly for the 
district heating company as the fixed part is a way of securing that operating and maintenance costs 
are covered although the heat load is variable. “The main reason there is a preference for a fixed 
charge is that heat demand is greatly variable over a year, and a high proportion of the operating 
costs of a DH system don't change in a short run. Therefore, a fixed charge can streamline the cash 
flow of producers” (Li et al, 2014).  
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Weighting investment cost 
For home-owners the district heating company can offer choice in how much investment costs are 
charged in relation to the fixed costs and variable energy price. The higher the investment costs, the 
lower the fixed and variable energy costs become. By weighting investment cost differently, home-
owners are given the opportunity to invest in the installation. Martensson & Frederiksen (2006) 
propose such a strategy for Swedish home-owners. They mention several advantages for home-
owners: 1) the price structure allows a better comparison with the fiercest competitor of DH in 
Sweden: the ground-source heat pump as heat pumps have similar large investment costs; 2) the 
price structure offers possibilities for a different ownership structure in which the local DH network 
will initially be owned by the district heating company and home-owners can obtain shares of a local 
energy company and become owners of the heating system. 
 
4.2.2 Differentiating to building type 
 
When differentiating to building type, the DH company sets prices according to different consumer 
types. This system exists in Finland, where the price differs between small private houses, 
apartments and industrial buildings based on tax rules and amount of consumption (Li et al., 2011). 
In this pricing system, the opportunity to switch to other heating alternatives is also taken into 
account. Owners of small houses have to pay higher prices than other types of buildings as it is easier 
for those home-owners to switch to other heating alternatives, such as electrical heaters or heat 
pumps.  
4.2.3 Price to capacity 
 
An alternative for a uniform price for all consumers is a differentiation in capacity. This is similar to 
electricity and gas suppliers, who also use different tariffs depending on the connection size. A large 
businesses pay more than small home-owners. In the telecom sector this principle is even further 
applied by offering consumers different products (phone and data plans) based on the expected used 
volume. A consumer with limited use of a mobile phone will choose a plan with a smaller volume 
than a consumer with a high use. The advantages for the consumer are that a phone plan is cheaper 
than paying prepaid and that total costs are better controlled. A similar principle could be applied in 
district heating networks by offering consumers different ‘heat plans’ based on a maximum of GJ 
used. This is a very different method of pricing in which the consumer is not charged the actual 
volume consumed (but sometimes a bit less). This option is more focused on increasing consumer 
choice and does not necessarily lead to lower costs.  
 
4.2.4 Variable tariffs 
 
Tariffs may also be differentiated between variability of price. Production and distribution costs of 
district heating will develop over time, depending on changes within the network, such as expansion 
of the network, construction of new production capacity, price changes in other fuels such as 
electricity needed to operate the network etc. Consumers can be offered choice to what extent they 
wish to be exposed to (and potentially profit from) price development. The district heating system of 
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Fortum in Stockholm for example offers its clients choice between half yearly changing prices, yearly 
changing prices with a summer and winter price and a fixed price (Harting, 2015).  
 
4.2.5 Real time heat load 
 
District heating load varies according to daily and seasonal patterns. Real costs of producing the heat 
vary accordingly, mainly caused by the fact that more expensive back-up plants are used to supply 
the peak load. To reflect real costs in the heating prices and form an incentive to consumers to 
decrease peaks and save energy costs, a pricing system based on real time costs can be proposed. 
The heat price will be higher during peak hours and lower for base-load consumption.  
Deventer, Gustafsson & Delsing (2011) propose a strategy for controlling the district heating load 
through real time pricing. In their model, the home substation receives price information from the 
heat supplier. The user’s wishes are communicated through the substation: a price is indicated for 
low prices, a tolerable temperature is indicated for high prices and the target indoor temperature is 
interpolated when the price is within a those two points. The substation adjusts the heat 
consumption accordingly. Such a pricing model lowers energy consumption and saves energy costs 
for consumers without compromising indoor comfort. Indirectly, this can make the DH network 
cheaper as pipes can have smaller dimensions when the peak load decreases. A variation to this 
model is a real time pricing model in which multiple buildings cooperate together and place bids for 
the potential to reduce heat consumption to an auction (Deventer, Gustafsson & Delsing, 2011). 
 
4.2.6 Differentiation between levels of sustainability 
 
In an open network, that allows the connection of many different sources of heat, there will also be a 
large variation in costs of different sources. Deploying the different sources in a cost-efficient way, 
for example in a base-peak-load or dynamic pricing system, will not necessarily be the most 
sustainable way. Customers could be offered a ‘green heat’ product next to the standard heat 
product in which they pay a bit more for heat from sustainable sources. Harting (2015) distinguishes 
three different ways to offer consumers the choice of ‘green heat’ versus the standard ‘grey’ heat: 
 
1) Offering ‘green heat’ as a new product in an existing network when new green production 
capacity are added to the system. Consumers could potentially stimulate investment decisions 
for green production capacity by demand for such a product and the willingness to pay a higher 
tariff.  
2) Enabling consumers to invest in new green production capacity by crowdfunding. Consumers will 
be offered a financial advantage in return. 
3) Choice of either ‘green heat’ or ‘grey heat’ for new connections to a district heating network. The 
choice for ‘green heat’ will affect the Energy Performance Coefficient of a building positively.  
 
4.2.7 Extended service offers 
 
In an extended service offer, the product is combined with a service related to the supply of heat. 
The possibilities are of course numerous. For example: combining the DH connection with a discount 
on glass fiber or a free energy coach that advises on energy saving measures.  
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4.3 Examples from practice 
We will now illustrate some approaches from practice: 
 
Den Haag De Oorden (social housing) 
The offer of  the initiative “Energie van de buurt” consists of a fixed discount of 10 percent on the gas 
price. The price is guaranteed for the long term, which includes a yearly price indexation with CPI 
(consumer price index) of the ACM (Autoriteit Consument en Markt) (Zwieterink, 2015). The energy 
bill consist of only a variable fee. Consumers only pay for what they use, which is also an incentive for 
insulation and other energy saving measures. Fixed costs are incorporated in the variable fee (GJ 
price). Connection the DH network is cost neutral for the owners. The owners do not pay a 
connection fee (related to investment costs of the DH network) but a yearly fee for avoided boiler 
costs (related to the current heating system). This is expected to lower the barrier for real estate 
owners switch to the DH network. Concerning services provided, the district heating provides the 
installation and if needed the technical home adjustments.  
 
Buurtwarmte Amsterdam (home-owners) 
Grid operator Alliander wants to support home-owners in Amsterdam to increase energy-efficiency 
by a neighborhood DH network. The approach that is chosen here is to get in close contact and 
cooperation with the future end-users from very early on in the process. The key to success is here 
seen as understanding the motivations of the people involved. Alliander responds to the already 
existing wish of home-owners in the neighborhood to become more sustainable in energy use. Unlike 
the core values as identified in section 2, sustainability is key in the value proposition. Before making 
the business case, the local grid operator talks to the people to poll the interest for neighborhood 
heating and comes with an tailor-made offer accordingly. Home-owners get the opportunity to 
become co-owners of the DH network, for example in the form of an energy cooperative, instead of 
being just a consumer. This mutual process is a promising step towards local sustainable energy 
initiatives for heating.  
 
Jämtkraft (home-owners) 
Jämtkraft (Sweden) made a package offer, consisting of a fixed district heat price for five years, long-
term (30 years) loans at a low interest rate and a guarantee on the installation (Mahapatra & 
Gustavsson, 2009). The offer also involved a discount for connection to the fibre optic 
broadband network (Tommerup, H. M, 2010). This is a good example of offering an additional 
product linked to the core product (section 2.7).  
4.4 Conclusions 
There are many solutions to increase consumer choice by using different price models. Many of them 
are not implemented in existing district heating networks but are currently subject of the debate 
around district heating and consumer choice. Some of the price models discussed are inspired by 
examples of Nordic district heating networks. Apart from the possibilities that are discussed above, 
there are many other instruments that may be used to create a good deal for consumers such as 
offering a discount to competitive alternatives, long term price guarantees, investment support to 
allow consumers participate and invest, technical guarantees etc.  
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Although there might be specific conditions to a (successful) implementation of these price models, 
there are two important general conditions: 
1. There should be legal support for implementing these solutions. The Dutch district heating 
act (Warmtewet) is highly limiting in introducing either one of these options. One solution 
would be to allow experiments with some of these options on a small scale. 
2. There should be sufficient financial possibilities for the district heating company to apply 
alternative price models. The introduction of some price models involves a higher risk for the 
district heating company, for example when applying variable tariffs. The goal of many 
alternative price models is to lower the costs of district heating for the consumer, which also 
decreases income for the district heating company. As a result, a cost reduction needs to be 
accomplished in another way.  
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Recommendations 
 
The literature review of customer satisfaction and needs has resulted in a set of values (checklist). 
However, peoples’ attitude and motivations differ from case to case. To develop new business 
models that better comply with customer needs, the specific attitudes of the potential new 
customers need to be mapped, for example by conducting questionnaires and interviews2. The 
attitudes should be tested not only quantitatively (how many consumers are sensitive to price) but 
also qualitatively (to what extent are consumers sensitive to price and is their behavior adaptable?). 
The results will give insight in how potential customers should be approached and how they can be 
persuaded to be connected to the district heating network. The ‘positive expected values’ of 
consumer satisfaction can be identified with these insights. 
To attract new customers and keep current customers satisfied, district heating companies need to 
convincingly offer consumers a good deal. New consumers need to decide whether to switch from 
the current heating system to a district heating connection or not. Customers of existing networks 
can act as ambassadors for new customers when they are satisfied about the products and services 
delivered. This exploration has proposed some approaches to make a good deal for consumers by 
looking at factors that influence consumer satisfaction. A good deal for consumers is strongly linked 
to customer needs.  
 
TPA could be a good measure to stimulate the use of small-scale waste heat and renewable heat. 
However, positive effects on district heating prices are expected to be low and consumer choice will 
not increase much. Alternative price models could be a more effective measure to increase 
consumer choice (and possibly other values as well). In this exploration some possibilities are 
mentioned, but those concepts need to be further developed and researched. An important aspect is 
the legal possibilities for product differentiation.  
  
                                                          
2 The starting situation of the potential customers of Warmtestad have been studied by a group of 
communication students of the Hanze University of Applied Sciences in collaboration with Warmtestad. We 
refer to the report “Aardwarmte: Ook een oplossing voor Groningen Noordwest?” 
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